Barney the Friendly Dinosaur was a popular children's television show in the 1990s. Barney had the unique ability to captivate young children, who would remain glued to the television, analyzing the purple dinosaur's every move. But, when adults watched the show, they were perplexed by what the children found so interesting about this anthropomorphic Tyrannosaurus rex. T e answer is simple: familiarity and predictability. Af er watching even a single episode, children became so familiar with Barney that they knew what he was going to do before he did it. As human beings, we are drawn to and f nd comfort in a world that is predictable. Unfortunately, our ability to predict the future in the real world is less accurate than in Barney's world.
Which leads us to one of the greatest regulatory challenges in translational research: the ability to accurately predict, from preclinical data, the human health risks associated with a new product. T is exercise is at best an imperfect science and is particularly challenging for new biomaterials or other novel technologies for which there are not well-established, standardized metrics for testing safety. T e limitations of established preclinical studieswhich include theoretical modeling, in vitro cell-based assays, and investigations in animal disease models-to recapitulate and accurately predict the safety and ef cacy of new products intended for human use have been well documented. Preclinical studies provide valuable data that can help scientists estimate starting doses for clinical trials and predict potential product-related safety issues. But ultimately, the performance of translational research requires a leap of faith because preclinical investigation cannot accurately predict every safety issue related to a product; there is always the risk of unanticipated adverse events.
T is uncertainty is balanced in part by the use of multiple preclinical model systems in an attempt to improve the accuracy of predictions; however, doubling up does not eliminate the uncertainty problem, which is compounded by what I refer to as the Barney phenomenon: an overreliance on a battery of familiar, well-established, but sometimes clinically less relevant investigations that are frequently required before performance of clinical studies. Substitution of wellestablished but clinically less relevant model systems with more ref ned and clinically relevant model systems of ers the ability to improve predictability with the use of fewer preclinical studies. For example, in our own ef orts to develop a tissue-engineered vascular graf (TEVG), we adhered to standard guidelines and performed costly, Good Laboratory Practice (GLP) studies to evaluate the inf ammatory response to the TEVG as subcutaneous implants in a variety of small-animal models instead of evaluating the inf ammatory response of our graf s in the circulatory system, where they would ultimately be used.
Although these studies provide a baseline level of data in support of the safety of our product in human subjects, I wonder how useful the data generated were in successfully predicting and preventing us from jeopardizing the safety of the patients? In fact, I would argue that evaluation of the inf ammatory response to a graf implanted in the subcutaneous space has little relevance to its inf ammatory response in the circulatory system. We have subsequently developed and validated new, more ref ned animal models that have enabled us to evaluate the inf ammatory response of our graf s in the circulatory system. T ese more clinically relevant models have helped us to further investigate the primary mode of action of our TEVGs and have provided clinical and pathophysiological insights that will guide us toward improvements in the safety and ef cacy of our product, aid us in the design of clinical trial protocols, help us to develop better quality-control and quality-FACE THE STRANGE So goes the proverb, "Where there's a will, there's a way. " But when translating biomaterials to the clinic, the "way" isn't always so clear. Moving biomaterial-based products from the bench to the clinic takes more than a will; it takes regulatory approval, too.
Regulatory hurdles for biomaterials that use clinically approved natural or synthetic scaffolds can be lower than those for new innovations. Under the 510(k) process at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), devices that are cleared as "substantially equivalent" to an existing device can be marketed quickly. Conversely, new materials have to prove biocompatibility with human tissues, which takes several additional years of preclinical (animal) studies. Translation: More time, more money.
T e challenge is how to innovate and translate safe, novel materials that address unmet clinical needs in the shortest amount of time possible. To identify some common bottlenecks, we asked nine biomaterials experts who are thought-leaders in one or more sectors-industry, nonprof t, academia, clinical, intellectual property, venture capital, and regulation-a seemingly straightforward question: "What is the biggest challenge in moving biomaterials into the clinic?" As you will see, their answers are complex, but one thing is clear: Translation is a convoluted path.
- Investigators and regulators share the same goal: to ensure the safety and promote the welfare of our patients. T e performance of translational research requires a careful evaluation of the degree of risk versus the potential benef t to the recipient. Ef orts to develop more relevant preclinical models rather than a persistent attachment to previously used, well-established, but clinically less relevant safety assays will accelerate and improve the process of bringing new technologies from the bench to the clinic. And that is a comforting thought.
NATURAL SELECTION AGAINST NEW BIOMATERIALS?
Alan Trounson, Ph.D.
President, California Institute for Regenerative Medicine (CIRM). E-mail: atrounson@cirm.ca.gov T e clinical translation of complex biologically responsive materials is a serious regulatory challenge in the biomaterials f eld.
T e use of biomaterials in regenerative medicine is in the early stages of its evolution to enable ef cient stem cell dif erentiation and maturation of biological functions of the products. Bioresponsive materials and gels such as self-assembling nanof bers can enhance the maturation of therapeutic cells-commonly, progenitor cells that give rise to selective tissue types-and integration of the dif erentiated cells into specif c tissues or body regions. In addition to cells, these biomaterials may also be further modif ed to deliver growth factors or other bioactive molecules. T e materials generally remain intact in the body only long enough to enable functional integration of the transplanted donor cells with host tissues before biodegrading at a predetermined rate.
Relative to purely synthetic or purely bioderived materials, bioresponsive materials face additional hurdles on the way to regulatory approval. First, these complex entities may be treated as combination products and require regulatory approval of the material or device as well as the cellular components for all aspects of safety and performance. Second, unlike scaf olds or matrix materials that are stable in the body, which are themselves challenging when it comes to obtaining regulatory approval, bioresponsive materials may need to demonstrate additional safety and ef cacy properties, such as appropriate gene expression and signaling for both donor-cell lineage maturation and host-tissue receptivity; cell and tissue integration without causing injuries (such as inf ammation, foreign-body response, f brosis, or rejection); safety of the degradation products; and longevity of therapeutic benef t. T ese requirements are all in addition to independent cell-product testing and take substantial additional resources to address.
Biotechnology companies prefer to develop cell products in approved materials rather than to take a new material and cell product forward, even if the new approach has the potential to be more ef ective clinically. Industry may even avoid the use of a material with a cellular product; for example, embryonic stem cell-derived retinal pigmented epithelial cells are in clinical trials for transplantation without an adhering scaf old that could ensure natural monolayer structure and function (NCT01344993). In the case of type 1 diabetes, companies with pending clinical trials prefer to deliver pancreatic β-islet progenitor cells housed in already-tested capsules rather than use new bioresponsive materials (such as selfassembling biopolymers) in order to avoid destruction of the cells by the recipient's immune system.
To enable their survival, either biomaterials or the regulatory process must evolve: Scientists may have to simplify bioreactive materials and cell composites, or regulatory agencies will need to make changes in the approval process to make the environment more hospitable for new materials. Either way, substantial changes are needed in both forks of the development pathway in order to assimilate the new opportunities of ered by biomaterials in the f eld of tissue engineering.
COURTING CAPITAL: DEVELOPMENT OR INTEGRATION?
Jef rey Schox, M.S., J.D.
Patent Attorney, Schox Patent Group, and Lecturer, Stanford Law School. E-mail: jef @schox.com T ere are of en dozens of technologies that must be integrated to commercialize a biomaterials product and-in stark contrast with large companies-a new privately held Translational labyrinth. Biomaterials translation mounts many obstacles, including time, money, innovation, and safety. Although the paths and outcomes are uncertain, the ultimate goal is not: improving human health.
" " company ("start-up") simply does not have the resources to develop each of these technologies. A major challenge for a start-up is to determine, of the various biological, chemical, mechanical, and electrical technologies, which will be developed as new technology and which will be integrated as existing technology from other companies. Members of a start-up team typically understand that the decision to develop or integrate technologies can have an impact on product-development time and product performance; but-because of the complexities of intellectual property law-start-up scientists are of en surprised by the impact of this choice on the ability of their project to attract funding from a venture capital f rm.
When considering an early-stage investment in a start-up, venture capitalists evaluate both the patentability of an invention-will the start-up be issued a broad and valuable patent portfolio-and the risk of patent infringement-will the start-up infringe any fundamental patents with the commercialization of their product. Ideally, from the viewpoint of the venture capitalist the start-up has both the opportunity to own a strong patent portfolio and a clearly def ned product development and commercialization pathway that avoids patent infringement.
Unfortunately, the choice between integrating or developing technologies puts these two goals into direct conf ict. Integrating existing technology from another company can involve the purchase of an ofthe-shelf component that includes a license to any underlying patents and potential indemnif cation against patent infringement lawsuits from other companies. T is resolves the infringement issues but does not create the foundation for a patent portfolio. Developing and manufacturing technology can of en lead to substantial improvements in product performance and reductions in costs, which can be the foundation for a strong patent portfolio but does not resolve any patent infringement issues because there can be broader patents that were f led earlier by other companies and that will prevent a start-up from commercializing its product.
In my experience, a start-up typically chooses to develop too many technologies, which increases infringement issues and reduces attractiveness to venture capital f rms. Ideally, at least in its early phase, a start-up develops only its "core" technologies-the ones that dif erentiate the start-up from other companies and other products-and integrates other existing technologies. T is strategic approach optimizes the intellectual property position of the start-up and may also minimize regulatory risk, which together strengthen the company's chances of attracting venture capital. From my perspective in academia, there are predominantly two schools of biomaterials innovators. One pushes the boundaries of how materials interact with biological systems. T ese "materials innovators" design new chemistries and functionalities and largely function outside the existing translational framework. T ey are not encumbered by def ning products and "pain points, " a regulatory path, or health care costs; they are motivated purely by academic curiosity about what biology and materials can do together. T ese scientists are critically important to our innovation ecosystem, but their advances risk being lost in a sea of published papers.
Conversely, "translational innovators" constrain their "sandbox" to existing FDA-approved materials and GRAS (generally regarded as safe) components. T ey recognize that the clinical development of an invention requires defnition of a product that can be sold. Traversing the clinical regulatory path is expensive, and the product must ultimately recover the investment made in its development. T is cost-benef t analysis tends to block the development of material systems that might carry regulatory risk. T e cost of translating new materials also can incentivize the development of expensive inventions and undermine ideas that could make health care more af ordable.
Ideally, we should strive to balance the repurposing of existing materials with the invention of new ones. T is compromise is important if innovation is going to drive health care, and its costs, instead of letting the regulatory framework guide and possibly restrict innovation. Such balance could be accomplished, in part, by promoting dialogue between these two worlds. Materials innovators should keep innovating even when they do not have all the answers but can be informed by the translational innovators; early visibility into how products may emerge from an invention can inform the myriad decisions that materials innovators make along the way. Translational innovators should facilitate the introduction of new material systems into humans, in spite of the increased regulatory risk, especially when the innovation enables functionality that can't be accomplished with existing materials (such as shape-memory or plasmonic materials).
" "
Of course, there are a few centers where this convergence is already happening, and there are even some individual labs that simultaneously pursue both paths. But the conversation between innovators can and should be extended further. Several new federal translational initiatives can serve to foster this dialogue, such as the newly formed National Center for Advancing Translation Sciences (NCATS) and programs such as the proposed National Centers for Accelerated Innovation (under the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute). Moving forward, fostering the interaction between materials and translational researchers will create a virtuous cycle that will maximize the impact of biomaterials on human health. Humacyte. E-mail: dahl@humacyte.com When initiating a "f rst-in-man" clinical study for a tissue-derived biomaterial, a product safety and function data package must convince investigators, institutional review boards, and regulatory bodies that the potential benef ts of the product outweigh the purported risks. Drugs and medical devices follow a ref ned preclinical testing framework: Animal models, study designs, statistical plans, and diagnostics practically comprise a "cookbook, " which facilitates the risk/benef t analysis process for all reviewers. T ere is no such cookbook for biomaterials with biologic components. T us, innovators must design their own preclinical studies, and the originality of each study design leads to a (rightfully) cautious regulatory review.
NO PRECLINICAL COOKBOOK
At our company, Humacyte, we are focused on producing human-derived, acellular extracellular matrices for vascular repair and replacement. T ese TEVGs are formed in bioreactors seeded with banked human vascular smooth muscle cells and then decellularized, yielding an acellular extracellular matrix that is stable and therefore could be readily available to patients. Our preclinical study design was shaped by factors that inf uence the biomaterial response in animals, including animal species, degree of phylogenetic disparity between the biomaterial and the recipient, the animal's age and growth rate, and the anatomical size of the animal and its ability to support the size of the biomaterial. As a f eld, our understanding of the impact of these factors on the response to a biomaterial continues to evolve. For preclinical evaluation of our TEVGs, we chose to test the actual product to be administered to humans in a nonhuman primate (NHP) model with no immunosuppression. Despite a study design that mirrored clinical application, this approach came with risks: NHPs are costly; the n was small compared with what reviewers expect for drug testing in smaller animals; the NHP model was new and had to be developed with surgical collaborators; and without immunosuppression, the xenogenic transplant presented a risk of rejection.
Clearly, there are many dif cult considerations associated with developing a preclinical study for TEVGs and other such biomaterials. Currently, there is no publicly available guidance document from regulators to guide innovators through preclinical assessment of complex products developed with tissue-based biomaterials. In the 1980s, when recombinant protein and monoclonal antibody biotherapeutics were transitioning from bench to clinic, product development ef orts benef ted from "Points to Consider" documents published by the FDA that provided valuable guidance. Innovators can help by having early discussions with regulators, in which preclinical design considerations can be vetted and alignment achieved. As regulators build expectations about preclinical study designs for generalizable groups of biomaterials, regulators can help by communicating their expectations of biomaterials innovators. Public regulatory guidance not only would provide future innovators with direction on which factors to emphasize in their preclinical study designs to best support further testing in humans, it also would ease the regulatory review process because data packages for dif erent products would look more consistent. National regulatory authorities have regionspecif c, legal def nitions of medical products from which f ow various regulatory pathways. In the United States, these principal def nitions-drug, biologic, and medical device-may apply singly or in combination to a product. For the purposes of determining a medical product's regulatory classif cation, both the physical product and associated information that describes its intended clinical use (or uses) are considered. T e resulting regulatory pathway is then based on how those characteristics f t the legal definitions. Biomaterials are not approved for medical uses in the United States on their own but rather as a constituent of a medical product-for example, scaf olds for cartilage repair. Because biomaterials may be incorporated in products meeting any regulatory def nition (drug, biologic, device, or combination), an understanding of which pathway applies for a specif c product is fundamental for prudent, expedient translation to a marketed clinical product.
EVERY PATHWAY STARTS WITH
Researchers must know their product suf ciently to know how their product is legally def ned (which regulatory def nition it meets). T e FDA provides numerous ways to gather this insight, including direct interactions with the review divisions that might review a product, or the Of ce of Combination Products (both informally and formally). T is knowledge will enable researchers to ef ectively develop their product in accordance with the regulatory expectation of the appropriate pathway. Failure to incorporate the appropriate manufacturing processes, controls, and testing (analytical, bench, preclinical, and clinical) into the development plan can stall translation of promising products. Although this is true for all products, the importance of incorporating knowledge of the regulatory pathway into the product development plan becomes increasingly important as products incorporate biomaterials in novel ways (or novel biomaterials, in general). Examples of such products include those in which the biomaterial or biomaterials are engineered to replicate anatomical structures (such as liver, bladder, or blood vessel), or in which biomaterials are combined with cells or other, separately regulated entities.
BIOMATERIALS AND CELLS: WELL, IT'S COMPLICATED… Chris Mason, M.D., Ph.D.
Advanced Centre for Biochemical Engineering, University College London. E-mail: chris.mason@ucl.ac.uk T e top regulatory challenge in the clinical translation of next-generation biomaterials is undoubtedly complexity and its impact on commercialization. T e long-term future of biomaterials lies in being combined with therapeutic agents, including small-molecule drugs, biologics, genes, cells, and other materials or devices to deliver cures or lifechanging (transformative) therapies. T ese " " multidisciplinary constructs are already beginning to f lter through the regulatory system, thus challenging regulators to rethink their traditional methodologies, which are deeply rooted in singleplatform technology products. At present, the vast majority of combination products are based on clinically approved materials, such as natural polymers, and traditional, surgically deployed biodegradable thermoplastics, including poly(glycolic acid) (PGA), poly(lactic acid) (PLA), and polycaprolactone (PCL). A PGA/poly(lacticco-glycolic acid) (PLGA) scaf old seeded with living cells has been used by Tengion to tissue-engineer replacement bladders (Neo-Urinary Conduit).
New materials that are untested in people are notably absent from tissueengineering clinical trials. T e major reason is that the route from scientif c discovery to use in routine clinical practice-even for a biomaterial used on its own-has challenging technical and regulatory hurdles along the way. When materials are used in combination with another new platform technology, such as gene or cell therapy, the hurdles appear insurmountable. Indeed, af er two decades, globally only a few tissue-engineered products have been approved by the regulators. Tissueengineered combination products initially were regulated by the FDA Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) . For example, tissue-engineered skin grown on a bovine collagen scaf old (Apligraf, Organogenesis) was originally approved in 1998 by CDRH. In 2012, a similarly constructed product, Gintuit (Organogenesis), was reviewed and approved by the Of ce of Cellular Tissue and Gene T erapies in the FDA Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER). Clearly, this FDA rationalization to have the core technologies (cells and genes) in the same FDA of ce as their related combination products is a win for pragmatism. Likewise in Europe, genes, cells, and tissue-engineered medical products are all covered by the Advanced T erapy Medicinal Products (ATMP) regulation.
Long development timelines, funding shortages, and regulatory uncertainty hinder the clinical translation and commercialization process for combination biomaterials. T e majority of companies working in this space are small start-ups. Venture capital funding is hard to get and is of limited duration (typically 5 to 7 years). Any hiccup in the process that creates a slight stall in a product's progress can mean the downfall of a company, especially singleproduct ones. T us, investors and investigators alike focus on removing complexity, by going with either cells or the biomaterial alone, to ease the regulatory burden and reduce uncertainty. Unfortunately, this strategy is in opposition with the diverse range of unmet clinical needs (many of which will not be solved by one technology alone) and the ability of the f eld to achieve its full potential through the development of multifunctional combination materials. T e regulatory moat-which is at present too wide and too deep for all but the big multinationals-must be bridged. One hopes that the FDA Safety and Innovation Act (signed into law on 9 July 2012), which includes the reauthorization of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act, will evolve into an exemplar to accelerate the regulatory approval of the tsunami of game-changing combination biomaterial products looming on the scientif c horizon. In 1901, President McKinley initially survived an assassination attempt. Rushed to the operating room, his surgeons raced to save his life. Working via ref ected sunlight and candles, the surgeons felt around in his abdomen for the bullet, eventually deciding to leave it inside him when they could not feel it. As the operation was concluding, so the story is told, a rudimentary electric light was brought into the operating theater but was not used. In the days af er the operation, T omas Edison delivered an early-generation x-ray machine to help the doctors locate the bullet. Once again, the potential benef ts were not recognized and this advanced tool sat idle. Several days later, McKinley died with the bullet still lodged in his abdomen.
ACCEPTING THE POSSIBILITY OF FAILURE
In the past century, technologies such as magnetic resonance imaging, angioplasty, and artif cial joints overcame the technical, clinical, f nancial, and regulatory barriers to transform lives. T ese successes are few compared with the number of promising medical products squelched during development, many by regulatory requirements and regulatory uncertainty. Convention tends to be favored rather than considering the potential for transformative impact of unfamiliar tools. As technology, including biomaterials, becomes more complex, regulators face the challenge of balancing between the potential benef ts of innovation (new materials) and the lack of additional risk to the public from using only what is already approved. To resolve this conundrum, should a regulator adopt the "zero risk tolerance" reinforced by Congress, the media, and the public? T is extreme prevents development of new biomaterials and medical products, although few would advocate that regulators should allow untested products to be marketed.
When metal-on-metal hips were proposed for clinical use, experts suggested that this material would benef t patients by providing a more durable implant. Scientif c and clinical knowledge was applied rigorously but was f awed because we did not yet know that in a small proportion of patients, metal debris from these materials could cause sof tissue necrosis. Such unanticipated failure can happen with new biomaterials, new uses of existing biomaterials, and medical products in general. To reduce human suf ering and address rising health care costs, society and Congress f rst must be willing to accept the possibility of failures en route to progress and champion this perspective while regulators adopt it. Only then will the product developers have the opportunity to create disruptive innovations that recalibrate quality and cost of care.
To reconf gure the medical product development landscape to accept the possibility of failure, we will need to def ne an acceptable frequency and severity of these failures. Although it seems unrealistic to advocate for lax standards for use of innovative products, it is perhaps rational to adjust the requirements to start clinical trials earlier. For example, instead of requiring a wide range of animal tests that may not predict human safety or ef cacy, why not skip the time-and cost-intensive studies and launch clinical trials for patients with no other options? T is will not identify rare events, as exemplif ed by the metal-onmetal hip example, but may provide opportunities sought by desperate patients and innovative product developers. If imagined risk trumps potential benef t, and barriers to translation seem insurmountable, our society also faces the possibility of losing innovators to opportunities outside of the United States as well as to unrelated f elds of science.
